On Wittgenstein’s "On Certainty"

“On Certainty”, which is called “the third Wittgenstein” by somewestern researchers on Wittgenstein such as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, is the last workwritten by Wittgenstein. As one of the representative works in the late Wittgenstein’sphilosophy,“On Certainty” retains the cream of Wittgenstein’s late thinking. But,different from “Philosophical Investigations”,“On Certainty” goes straight to theepistemic problem, and tries to answer the question on the certainty of knowledge,which is raised by the skeptic.“On Certainty” makes “certainty” as its main thesis,which is why Wittgenstein named the work “On Certainty”. While what is this“certainty”？Wittgenstein made a response at the query from some philosophizers likeMoore in “On Certainty”, approaching the nature of our basic assurance as “Here isa hand” or “I am standing here” in our language. However, this kind of assurance isnot knowledge。“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest.”But Wittgenstein’s discussion didn’t stay here. Actually,“On Certainty” emphasizesthe distinction between certainty and knowledge in its many chapters. This paper willrefute the skepticism in the angle of Wittgenstein’s view, from the skepticism backgrounded on the present-day philosophy and the response to the skepticism. It will alsojump out of the thinking model of traditional theory of knowledge where subjectivityand objectivity is segregated, and returns to our daily life and the web of language-game,to talk over the “hinges”(the certainty in logic on grammar, life and system) which isput forward by Wittgenstein and make Wittgenstein’s characteristic (his non-subjective,non-objective, non-inferential analytical way, and reinterpretation of knowledge at thehigh of the philosophy in the20th century) outstand.