The Illegal Land Reserves Decision And Control Of Estate Developers Based On The Evolutionary Game Theory

Recently, the phenomenon of illegal land reserves in China has been more and more serious. It not only causes harm to developers, but also seriously affects the healthy development of the real estate industry and other industries, which brings on series of social problems. The harm of illegal land reserves has been a broad consensus. So the government frequently promulgated land disposal laws and regulations, also, scholars have discussed strategies fervently.However the existing literature is mainly from technology angle to monitor the land ,or from the enterprise angle to research the land reserve and the decision method of the land reserve ,or from the government angel to research the control strategy of land. Although, these researches play a certain help on illegal land reserves and enterprises'decision, but it is poor.This paper tries to use the evolutionary game theory to explore the real estate developers based on the store game model firstly.Then, analyze the land hoarding mechanism of the real estate developers , and puts forward management suggestions in the end.The research content of this paper is :firstly, according to the land reserve theory of real estate developers and the theory of idle land,this text will combe the decision behavior mechanism of storing land of the developers . secondly ,all of these follwing models will be established in this research ,Such as , the Evolutionary Game model of storing land'strategeies of the symmetry real estate developers, the Evolutionary Gamemodel of storing land'strategeies of the asymmetric real estate developers, the Evolutionary Gamemodel of storing land'strategeies of the real estate developers between local governments, and last of all, the Evolutionary Gamemodel of storing land'strategeies of the real estate developers between land inspectors, which will be used to analyze the real estate developers'decision and evolution trend in different conditions and the evolution trend of the government land control. Finally, according to the model conclusion ,this give some regulation advices for government regulation and some management advice for real estate developers.The empirical results supports most of the model .The executive summary will be showed as follows:(1) The strategy of the other enterprises engaged in real estate development, local government, land inspector all will affect the strategy of the real estate developer.The specific factors include :the income of the illegal land reserves ," hitchhike" income, government incentives, land acquisition costs, land holding cost, land unused cost and image loss cost.(2)When the land unsed cost is same and less than the income of the illegal land reserves,the phenomenon of illegal land reserves will be more and more serious.When the government regulates moderately, the Illegal land reserves'evolutionary trend of the real estate will achieve a certain proportion of stability.(3)When the part of incomes for developers on land reserves more than the summation of acquisition cost and land holding cost; and the cost of land reserves controlling for local government less than the benefit of land reserves controlling ,this ESS system result in land reserves being current without control of local government. As the developping of socio-economic and the use of land more and more sufficiency,the evolution of land reserves consequentially tend to no illegal land reserving behavior ,but this may need a long time.So,our current mission is to prevent local government in collusion with developers ,arouse the control enthusiasm of local government ,severely punish those who inaction in controlling illegal land reserving.,raise the reward and controlling receive of those who action,at the same time , lower the controlling cost of local government.(4)Labor cost,corrupt receive,diligent cost,struggle cost and corrupt loss,all these are the main factors,which influence the land monitoring officer's action tactics .When the net cost,which is subtraction of corruption incomes and corruption loss,is more than monitor cost,the officer's actual monitoring ratio and the developer's land reserving ratio effect mutually, without a stabilize dot, but a dynamic state processing.At this time,the reasonable ratio of actual monitoring is (R₂₁– C₂₁)/C₂₁,and the land reserving ratio is C₁₁/(C₁₃– R₁₂–C₁₂).If we want to lower the land reserves ratio and increase the actual monitoring ratio,we should raise the cost of corrupt for the land monitoring officers ,at the same time,cut down the operative cost of them.According to the conclusions, some regulation advices for government and some management suggestions for the real estate developers are showed as follows:(1)The regulaton advices for government: the suggestion of idle land laws and regulations, may refer to this store difference punishment model; reform of local government evaluation system; control the use of land, land transaction; to strengthen the real estate enterprise investment control, information control, entry and exit market regulation; and improvement of land supervision system. (2)The management advices for enterprise :To make a plan of land- reserve , to build a land information system, to diversificate the channels of financing,Establish the project management system, make overall budget and strengthen quality management...