Firm Life-cycles, An Empirical Study Of Listed Companies On The Relation Of Power Balance And Corporate Performance

Since the reform of splitting share structure, the differences of price and rights between non-tradable shares and tradable shares have become less, the "dominance" phenomenon in listed companies in China has been corrected in some degree. in this background, more and more minority shareholders realized to protect their rights and raise many issues. As more as possible to avoid the expropriation of minority shareholders of listed companies in China has become the most effective way to solve the governance problems. it is very difficult to judge that which is better between concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership. if we can find a balance point between concentrated ownership and dispersed ownership which can both absorb the strengths and avoid short comes, many complex problems would be solve more easily. the present study has been carried out multi-angle discussion, but the study from the business life cycle is rare. This paper argues that the value of stock structure of the enterprise is not absolutely isolated. It should be placed among the business environment in which we can analyze the specific conditions of business life cycle.So the main line of this article is that in balanced ownership structure how did the corporate performance change with some vareables.at the same time, we consider the effects of balanced share hold ownership from different stages of businenee life circle, because different stages have different strategic choices.Block holders refers to two or more large shareholders to control the company, through the inside contain, any single large shareholder can not implement the majority control. In different stages of the life cycle, the enterprise's financial and accounting data show a system variation, and the framework of the enterprise life cycle indicators can help to understand the value of relevance usefulness.Based on the judging, the paper accumulates the three years (2007-2009) dates of investment cash flow and raise cash flow of all listed companies that have complete cash flow dates, and screens the samples of growth enterprise and mature enterprise, deleting the samples not according with ownership restriction condition. In addition, the ownership restriction condition in this paper means the share ratio of the largest shareholder is less than 50 percent, and second-largest shareholder's is greater than 10%.This paper sets six assumptions about listed companies of not absolutely holding:H1:The shareholding of the second-largest shareholder's in fast-developing enterprise's negatively correlates with corporate performance.H2:The number of growth-oriented enterprises ownership restriction (Controlling shareholders share ratio of the number of shareholders to 10%) of fast-developing enterprise negatively correlates with corporate performance.H3:The share balance between the first big shareholders and the second largest shareholder in fast-developing enterprise has positive correlation with corporate performance.H4:Mature enterprise's second-largest shareholder's positively correlates with enterprise operating performance.H5:The number of growth-oriented enterprises ownership restriction (Controlling shareholders share ratio of the number of shareholders to 10%) in mature enterprise positively correlates with corporate performance.H6:The share balance between the first big shareholders and the second largest shareholder in mature enterprise has negative correlation with corporate performance.The empirical results show that partly explains variable has stronger explain ability and changes in the direction consistent with the hypothesis. 1.In fast-developing enterprise, the differences between other large shareholders and the first large shareholder smaller, there would be greater negative impact on the performance of enterprises. The reason for it is these companies have to deal with the product and market expansion, which calls for some flexibility to cope with the demand for high-speed growth. So corporate governance of these companies should focus on improving the efficiency of enterprises in the decision-making to grasp the strategic opportunities for development.2. There is not significant correlation between the Share of the largest shareholder and business performance in fast-developing enterprise. The reason for this is may be the sample size focus only on equity balance class enterprise. In these enterprises, due to the presence of countering shareholders, share of the largest shareholder can't completely highlight quickly and efficiently decision-making advantage that against all the odds.3. Maturity in the enterprise, the second largest shareholders share and busing performance show a significant positive correlation. As a shift in strategic direction, the focus of corporate governance in this state will be followed to change. So the ownership structure with a supervisory which constraints largest shareholder's selfish behaviors that seek the harm on other shareholder rights will enhance corporate value.4.There is not obvious relationship between the numbers of balanced-ownership shareholders and enterprise management performance in mature enterprises. Also is the difference of first shareholder and second shareholder.At last, in response to these conclusions, this paper shows for the growing business and maturity of different ideas to improve businesses performance, and point out that if we want to fundamentally solve the complex problem, we should change the stock market environment and optimize the legal environment.