Research On A Supply Mechanism Of Public Good With Asymmetrical Information

On the problem of public goods characterized simultaneously by the properties of non-excludability and non-rivalry, comparatively sufficient theoretical analysis, statistical examinations and experimental tests, are made by the relevant scholars on the optimal quantity, preference revealing mechanism, the possible problems resulted by private supply of public goods, and the impact of governments'supply on public goods, but how to provide public goods effectively is still in the process of exploration and there is not a common understanding on the supply mechanism of public goods.This paper initially explores the supply mechanism of public goods with asymmetrical information. Under a series of assumptions and based on the achieved results on the expected utility theory and information economics, a principal-agent model of public goods'supply is established, and also a simulated computing case is provided to examine the calculating method on the condition of linear contract. By this model, under the linear payment mechanism, the consumers and the public department have the same and constant risk-averse degree which is lower than that of the firm, at the same time, an equation constraint of the likeliness ratio and the transfer rate of marginal utility of consumers to the firm is satisfied.Through the design and implementation of principal-agent mechanisms, the function that embodies the characters of the optimal contractive payment mechanism can be found, by which, to design a principal-agent contract can effectively avoid the moral hazards existing in the production process of public goods. Enough attention should be paid on principal-agent relations in the process of public decision-making, and the assumption of "economic man" should be a natural precondition in constituting economic rules and laws.