The Research About Executivescontrol And Executive Payin Private Listed Companies

Corporate governance, executive compensation have always been the classical problem in the study of corporate finance. The research of the relevance between corporate governance and executive compensation begin from the analysis frame of agency theory.Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign literature studies, this paper argues that previous theory for corporate governance, management incentive and earnings management research of the relationship between exist below inadequate:first, focusing on executive pay and earnings management, the relationship between the domestic and foreign theorists research has rarely involves for executive compensation control of executives at impact. second, the domestic and foreign theorists main separately inspected the managers incentive and earnings management, governance and management incentive, and corporate governance and earnings management, but for the relationship between control and executive pay executives at the inner relation and interaction mechanism research limited.Based on the above summarizes research, and on the basis of theoretical analysis framework based on agent, corporate governance, management incentive in the same model analysis, reveals the causal relationship between the two.Starting from analyzing earning management motivation, and combining agency theory and incentive theory, we set up H1:there is earning management action for the purpose of high compensation, that is,executive compensation is positive to earning management. On this basis, combining with actual situation in China, private listed company executives by study and analysis by control for personal interests, and puts forward the mode and form hypothesise H2:Through the model for empirical research and cannot come to clear evidence of executive pay is related with executives control. We use the data of publicly listedcompanies in China,2007—2009.to examine hypotheses we set up. We control the influence of earning management with non-compensation motivation to our research when choosing samples. Based on the theory model, this paper sets up model using Eviews software to analyze the data.Through this paper theory (chapter 3) and empirical (chapter 4) research can reach the following policy proposals:firstly, further improve the listed company incentive system, establishing relevant law laws and regulations system and information disclosure system, actively promote managers and shareholders, inhibit the incentive compatibility managers control rent-seeking behavior; the second, improve the internal management system and the governance structure, perfect manager market, create agent, and try to avoid competitive platform manager from the controlling shareholders unit or serve concurrently as the chairman of the listed company, weaken the managers control power will help reduce agency cost; thirdly,and improve the external supervision mechanism of listed companies, especially must strengthen the big shareholders through indirect expropriation behavior of executives supervision and restraint.