Under The Control Of Large Shareholder' Agency Conflicts And Auditor Selection

Due to China's listed companies are mostly made by state-owned enterprise restructuring, to date, a higher proportion of state-owned listed companies, high concentration of equity makes the major shareholders have sufficient incentives for managers to monitor, which to some extent, to avoid the shareholders of the "free rider" behavior; the other hand, in the case of ownership concentration, the major shareholder of the company made Control over the use of corporate control will inevitably take over control of the private benefits, to the detriment of the interests of minority shareholders. According to the agency theory, the independent audit is an efficacious way of corporate governance to reduce agency costs, and efficacious audit can play an effective role what depends on the level of audit quality. As the international "Big Four" accounting firm has a good international reputation, and it have huge number of customers around the world and the customer base, making their global offices and entities closely linked together, if there has a audit failure of market what may be lead to the destruction of the entire company. Therefore, generally believe that the international "Big Four" firms more independence than domestic firms, audit quality is higher too.Review of existing literature, the results show that the agent under the control of major shareholders conflict and positively related to auditor choice, the paper in 2006-2009 between the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange A share listed companies as samples, to Our unique system as the background, taking into account the control of listed companies of different types of people, under the control of major shareholders and the proxy conflicts between the auditor selected empirical research. This paper focuses on the following issues: (l)Large shareholders and managers of the agency auditor choice between conflict and the existence of relationship? (2)A majority shareholder agency conflicts with minority shareholders of listed companies in the existence of serious high-quality demand for auditor choice? (3) The different nature of the controlling shareholders, major shareholders and under the control of agency conflicts between auditor choice is different? (4)The rule of law at different levels, the major shareholder of the agency under the control of conflict and the relationship between auditor choice if there were differences?According to the empirical analysis of test results, with the current major shareholder of China under the control of agency conflicts and legal status of the environment, make relevant policy recommendations.