Study Of Preventing Moral Hazard Of General Manager In State-Owned Enterprises

The state-owned enterprises is the pillar of Chinese national economy, therefore the healthy development of state-owned enterprises is a significant economic and political issue for its close relationship with the improvement of national economy and the prospect of socialist cause. Whether the state-owned enterprises can shoulder the historical mission which CCP and the country entrust with is largely dependent on the full exertion of qualified people in state-owned enterprises. This article creatively defines the research subject of general manager in the state-owned enterprises by analyzing agency by agreement chain of state-owned enterprises which is an important component of the talented workforce in state-owned enterprises management and the backbone of enterprises management. The moral hazard of general manager in the state-owned enterprises is a universal reality, whether it can be effectively prevented determines the success of state-owned business management. From the different angles of classical economics, information economics, the new system economics, economical ethics, this article has analyzed the mechanism and four main sources of the moral hazard which are as followed:firstly, the profit subject is not unanimous; Secondly, the information is not complement; Thirdly, the enterprise management environment are uncertain; Fourthly, the contract is not mature. With the actual situation of the state-owned enterprises reform and the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, this article proposes three emphasis to prevent moral hazard of the general manager in state-owned enterprises as follows: to perfect corporate governing structure, to push marketability and professionalism of general managers. Based on the three points, this paper reached some conclusions which are very effective to prevent moral hazard of general manager in the state-owned enterprises by applying the three kinds of methods together.