Research On The Relevances Between The Corporate Governance And The Divedend Policy

The relevances between the company governance and the dividend policy have been the hot spot which the economical academic circle studies. But the overwhelming majority aim at the relevances between the stockholder's rights structure and the dividend policy, very few on other aspects of the company governance(for example:the salary incentive mechanism for management). In addition, the relevances between the company governance and the dividend policy are basically studied with the data before the reform of split share structure in China.Then along with the reform's advance of split share structure, the conditions of the listed companies's government will change,so this possibly exert influences on the dividend policy.However a relative system's research about this aspect hasn't appeared. Based on this, this article integrate various factors of the company governance to a system to study the relevances between the governance and the dividend policies of the listed companies in recent years (i.e. around the share reform) with the method which unifies the theories and the empirical analysis.Because the cash dividend is the main distribution method for profit in the mature capital markets in the world,and is also the main dividend form in our country, this article mainly aims at the company governance and the cash dividend policy to study the relevances.First, unifying the present situations about the corporate governance and dividend policies in our country, this article elaborates the serviceability that the proxy cost theory and the hypothesis about the major stockholder invading benefits can explain the dividend policies of the listed companies in our country based on theoretical analysis. Subsequently, this text analyzes the characteristics of the dividend policies, specially the cash dividend policy, and corporate governance by the method of statistics and description, and points out the particularity of the dividend policies and corporate governance of the listed companies in our country unifying the present situations in some developed countries,for example, England, American, Japan, German, and so on. Then based on the theory elaboration and the statistical analysis, the article analyzes the influences that the corporate governance on the cash dividend policy unifying the proxy cost theory and the hypothesis about the major stockholder invading benefits, and confirms the relevances between the corporate governance on the cash dividend policy using LOGIT and the linear regression empirical analysis methods. The article discovers that, the existence of holding shareholder and the first major stockholder for state-owned shares and the more standard establishment for the four commissions and the more salaries for the high managers can positively cause the assignment of cash dividend, through LOGIT analysis; And on the foundation of the LOGIT analysis, the article indicates that, the proportion of stocks that the first shareholder owns and the salary level for the high managers are remarkably positively related to the payment level of the cash dividend, through linear regression. Finally, based on the influence that the payment level of the cash dividend on the value of the company, the article further studies the suitable dividend theory to explain the cash dividend policy of the listed companies in our country using the multi-dimensional linear regression method. The research discovers that although the hypothesis about the major stockholder invading benefits can explain the cash dividend policy in some extent, the proxy cost theory is stronger. And following the completion for share reform and the development of the social economy, the principal-agent theory will have the further serviceability.This research indicates that in order to standardize the dividend policy, improve the non-assignment, enhance the level of the cash dividend, and have the cash dividend policy get sufficient effect on the corporate governance, optimizing the structure of the company, increasing the share proportion the high managers own, improving the structure of the board, paying attention to the salary incentive mechanism, and strengthening the protection for the investor will be our inevitable choice.