The Research On The Relationship Between The Ownership Structure Of Listed Companies For The Factors Affecting Cash Dividend Based On The Ultimate Control

Dividend policy, as a significant aspect of enterprise finance management, has always aroused attention in both domestic and international academic researches. The net profit, which is available for distribution, can either be assigned to investors or be retained in the company. Particularly, in the case of relatively limited net profit, the reasonable determination of the ratio between distribution and retention has a direct influence on some related important issues, such as the balance of short-term and long-term interests of enterprises, as well as the relationship between shareholders and enterprises.Compared with the western mature market, the dividend distribution policy in China is quite different due to the specific ownership structure. In the most cases of western market, the dividend can reduce agency costs between managers and shareholders. While in China, the ownership structure has been artificially divided into non-tradable shares and tradable shares, and as a result, the agency problem turns to the contradiction between non-tradable shareholders and minority shareholders. From April of 2005 to now, non-tradable shares reform has been carried out for 5 years in China, and with the deepening of the reform, all listed companies achieved the complete circulation. The problem is:whether the confusion of market which is caused by asymmetrical ownership structure has been improved yet? This paper takes non-tradable shares reform as background, introduces the research method of ultimate control, divides the ownership structure into two groups:the high level of outside bolckholder and the low level of outside bolckholder, and then establish the model of general multiple regression in order to research the factors affecting dividend distribution before and after the reform. The purpose of the research is to verify the effectiveness of non-tradable shares reform by comparing the differences before and after the reform.The research discovered that the largest ultimate controlling shareholder correct the benefit orientation actually and no longer prefers to cash dividend after non-tradable shares reform, which indicates that the effectiveness of the share reform is prominent; the second-largest shareholder balances the largest shareholder slightly both before and after the reform, but when the outside bolckholder is high after the reform, the second-largest shareholder and the largest shareholder will conduct the competition for interests;the positive effect between ownership concentration and cash dividend has been suppressed, and the high level of outside bolckholder can reduce the effect of high ownership concentration; the controlling shareholder doesn't plunder more because of the deviation of cash flow rights and control rights.