Study On The Problem Of Transcendental Imagination In Kant's Epistemology

Transcendental imagination in Kant's epistemology is a equivocal concept, mainly appears in the part of transcendental deduction of categories, as an intermediary between intellectuality and sensibility. We get two different "transcendental imagination" from the two different versions of transcendental deduction of categories. In the first version of transcendental deduction, there are more decription of imagination than that in the second version, and we get a strong impression of the synthetic ability and reproductive ability of transcendental imagination; but in the second version we get a "transcendental imagination" as a dependent intermediary rather than an independent ability, and we don't see its reproductive abililty. It's hard to get a clear concept of transcendental imagination, because of Kant's different discription of it. Is it an independent ability or not? By analyzing two versions of transcendental deduction, we see two conflict spontaneities, one is from intellectuality and the other is from transcendental imagination. Such a conflict is partly due to Kant's inconsistent method of work in the Critique of Pure Reason. Form and Ability are unified in intellectuality, but Kant completely separates them sometimes. When he talks about the synthetic ability of transcendental imagination, the intellectuality is a set of dead forms, when he emphasizes the authority of intellectuality, forms and ability are unified. It's impossible to define transcendental imagination clearly. Actually, the problem reveals dualistic antithesis in the traditional epistemology. The dichotomy of sensibility and intellectuality results in an transcendental imagination which will never coordinate with intellectuality.