Under Asymmetric Information About Venture Capital Lease Arrangements

In the course of venture capital, investor,venture capitalist and ventureenterpriser form the relationship of principal agent. Venture enterpriser hasmore information than the venture capitalist, which results in venturecapitalist's adverse selection and venture enterpriser's moral hazard. In thispaper,information economics has been applied to the research of the game betweenventure capitalist and venture enterpriser. This paper tries to study venturecapitalist's agency venture due to asymmetric information and how to conqueragency venture. It has following achievements: (1) simulation the relationshipbetween venture capitalist and venture enterpriser as a model;(2) applyingquantitative method and qualitative method to testify the validity of incentivemechanism, such as contract design, phases investment, effective supervise,flexible stock proportion setting, report mechanism.The limited partnership venture capital firms have become the essentialorganized form of American venture capital industry. Analyzing the organizationstructure of the limited partnership, managing mechanism,and the theoriesbackground, venture capital's effect of supervisal and reputation have effectedof resolving the moral hazard and prompting problem under the asymmetryinformation environment. The limited partnership is the integration of thelimited liability and the common partnership, its special design adapted to thedemand of small business and high technique business ,effectively resolved theproblems of operation cost,agent cost and prompting restrict etc during thecourse of venture capital. It is the best organized form of venture capital.China government should draw up the laws of the limited partnership as soon aspossible, setting up perfectly limited partnership venture capital firm to adaptto the request of the new situation.