A Study On The Correlation Between Executive Compensation And Performance Of Listed Commercial Banks In China

Executive compensation has become a common problem in modern enterprises. How to solve this problem has become the focus of public concern.As a result, the relationship between executive compensation and business performance has become a hot topic. It is well known that China’s commercial banks have the phenomenon of "short- term incentive, long-term incentive problem", and to solve the problem of principal-agent problem in our country "s banking industry. A good incentive mechanism is the most effective solution.Only by playing the role of incentive mechanism can promote the management of the positive work, and ultimately improve the business performance.Firstly, select the 16 listed banks will be divided into state-controlled and non-state holding.Because of various factors, the executive compensation and management performance of the state-owned holding banks are not significantly related to the phenomenon, but the non state holding banks are significantly related to the phenomenon. Then, in the non state-owned banks choose Ping An Bank, the most representative of the general law of the case study, comprehensive analysis of Ping An bank executive compensation system.Finally in order to optimize the banking executives salary system, strengthen the banking executive compensation incentive mechanism, starting from the bank’s own widespread problems, put forward corresponding suggestions, and ultimately to achieve the optimization of the salary system of China’s banking industry executives.