Pricing And Game Analysis Of Dual Channel Supply Chain Based On CVaR Criterion And Channel Selection

With the rapid development of technology, the network marketing rises to a new supply chain mode and more and more scholars pay attention to the research of dual-channel supply chain model. The uncertainty in the market will be at risk for the decision of supply chain members, so it is important for us to consider a layer of supply chain decision makers’risk problem. With the emergence of large retailers and manufacturers competition brought by the network channels, many retailers are also actively opening online retail channels to make their own benefit, so this new supply chain structure is the improvement of the research of existing supply chain problem. In this paper, based on the CVaR criterion and channel selection, we study the pricing and game model in a dual-channel supply chain.The chapter 2 introduces the game theory, the Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk and analysis of variance theory.In chapter 3, we study a dual-channel supply chain with a risk aversion man-ufacturer and a risk neutral retailer, the manufacturer decides not only the direct channel production but also the direct channel price, the retailer not only decides retail price but also the retail channel quantity. Based on the CVaR criterion, we establish manufacturer-leader Stackelberg game model, retailer-leader Stackelberg game model and Nash game model,respectively, and calculate the conditions that the optimal decision under three game models to meet, and analyze the degree of risk aversion influence on the optimal decision. Finally, a numerical example is analyzed the effect of the degree of risk aversion on manufacturer’s CVaR value and retailer’s expect profit.In chapter 4, we study the network channel selection of retailer and pricing research under the manufacturer has established an online channel. We set up three non-cooperative game models, then calculate the optimal price, and the maximum profits of manufacturer and retailer. Then we compare the influence of different parameters on the optimal prices and the maximum profits. Finally, we compare the optimal pricing and maximum profit under the retailer different channel strategy (whether set up retailer network channel).In chapter 5, we summarize the research results on the pricing and game model problems in a dual-channel supply chain, and expect more researches related to this aspect.