| In this thesis, the Johnson Administration's perception and response to China's first nuclear test are studied. The author tries to explore the evolvement of the China policy and the nonproliferation policy of Johnson Administration in the mid-1960s through the interpretation of the newly declassified archives, investigate the deep causes of these policy evolvements by means of constructivism framework.In the view of the Johnson Administration, the significance of China's nuclear explosion was mainly on the psychology of his neighbors, and would induce the nuclear proliferation trends among other countries in the world. In response to China's nuclear explosion, on one hand, the Johnson Administration appeased his Asian allies by emphasizing the United State's promise on collective security. On the other hand, the Johnson Administration fought to rally the world's opinions to condemn China as a nuclear proliferator, trying to push China into the international injustice.Johnson Administration believed that China could use the political effect of the nuclear explosion to conduct indirect aggression by means of subversion, and sought the hegemony in Asia. This belief led the Johnson Administration to reinforce the"containment"to China by escalating the Vietnam War, at the same time stood firm on the position that China should be isolated from the international community; otherwise it would be considered rewarding China's aggression. However, under the influence of China's nuclear test, there were unprecedentedly strong appeals in the international community calling that China should be admitted into the United Nations. Faced with this dilemma, the Johnson Administration eventually adjusted its China policy into"containment but not isolation".On the nonproliferation policy, faced with the trends that many countries want to obtain their own nuclear weapons stimulated by China's nuclear test, the Johnson Administration, after cautious consideration, decided to bring a rigorous nonproliferation policy, even on the cost of putting pressure on his allies and uniting the Soviet Union, to promote the conclusion of the"Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty", which ended up as the most crucial step toward the founding of the international nonproliferation institution.To look at it as a constructivist, the United States had several different identities:"a democratic country checking the Communism expansion"as his type identity,"the leader of Atlantic allies"and"the protector of Asian anti-communism camp"as his collective identity, and"a nuclear power willing to stop the nuclear proliferation"as his role identity. These identities were activated when the Johnson Administration responded to China's first nuclear test, showing its national interests in various fields. Faced with different interests constituted by different identities, the Johnson Administration hesitated on whether or not continuing to isolate China from the international community. The essence of the"containment-but-not-isolation"China policy raise in 1966 by the Johnson Administration could be seen as the answer to deal with this dilemma. |
