Control And Incentives In Public Organizations

In China's contemporary society, the institutional change mainly conducted by public organization has arrived into a urgent period .How to establish an effective public organization becomes a key problem .An effective public organization demands constructing a kind of intense incentive structure of inner govern which under the effective control.This paper employs some basic theories such as organizational economics , politics sociology and so on , tries to find the micro-running process and mechanics of pubic organization, improves the humanity to grasp the knowledge of public organization ,further design an effective organization with constructional equilibrium about control and incentive .Firstly, the issue generalizes several function elements within public organization , then analyses the public organization's specializations and take them as the entrance for analyses .secondly , settles a dual principal-agent framework which is modified and deduced from transactibnal costs theory in terms of organization economics .In such framework the issue discusses the control and incentive ,analyses its uncoordinated phenomena .Consequently ,compares some superiorities and inferiorities of three institutions on base of generalizing the cause of uncoordinated phenomena .Finally ,points that if to strengthen the controland incentive of public organization currently ,not only should the bureaucrats be intensified and perfected ,but also the compound governing construction be established .For more ,outer institutional environment should be constructed as well.