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The Rules Of Public Choice: Difficulties And Beyond

Posted on:2005-06-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W R JiaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2206360125952165Subject:Political economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The question of the rule for voting, especially the Vote Paradox in the majority rule, is a controversial domain in the theory of Public Choice. The purpose of this article is to probe into the nature of Majority rule and analyze the formation of Vote Paradox, its effect and how to resolve it. The article's methods, framework and achievements are as follows: Firstly, this article gives a comparison of Unanimous Agree Rule and Majority rule, and apply it in the analysis of Pre-restraint of the theory of constitutional government.Secondly, the article analyzes the formation of Vote Paradox under the rule of majority. Classical probability is used to analyze the relationship between Bimodal Partiality and Vote Paradox in 3 X 3 Model. The calculation of the probability of the occurrence of Vote Paradox in the 3 X 3 Model is also made by the article.Thirdly, this article discusses the substitution of other rule for Condorcet Rule, and proves the internal contradiction of Berda Rule through the analysis of The utility theory of base figure and The utility theory of ordinal number.Finally, the article review the research for Arrow's Impossibility Rule in the latest decades and attempts to untie the ethical restrictions of it. The article's view is that a no-transmitting vote rule is ethically acceptable if it can guarantee the equitability.Jiao Weiran (political economics) Directed by professor Ye xiangsong...
Keywords/Search Tags:Public Choice, Majority Rule, Sample, Unanimous Agree Rule, Vote Paradox, Arrow's Impossibility Rule
PDF Full Text Request
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