| This paper analyzes the Credit Disorder in China Securities Market from the Information Economics and Game Theory. The author hold that the main reasons for the credit disorder of China Securities Market are :1,the unclear property rights of China's state-owned enterprises during the economic transition period thus leading to the non marketing behaviors of the main market body . 2,asymmetry of informationï¼›3,the wrong orientation of the China Securities Market as a pure tool of financing for the state-owned enterprises.4,more than 70% state-owned shares are uncirculatable. The corporate governance of the stock-listed public corporation is still very poor. And the inner -control phenomena are very prevalent and serious.5,the cost is too low to deter the corporations from loss of Credit.The paper points out that the most fundamental measures to better the issue of the cr edit order in China Securities Market lies in the development of the clear property rights of China's state-owned enterprises . Based on the above, the paper deals with the problem of ethic risk and adverse selection in the stock-listed public corporation caused by the asymmetry of information. And the idea of its solution, involving the establishment and standardized operation of the intermediary organizations and the perfection of economic credit laws and regulations, is presented. |