Centralized Control Over Dependent On The Experimental Study Of The Preferences

Traditional economic theories investigate individuals' equilibrium state and decision-making process based on market theory. But the economical science can not be perfectly explained only by price theory. There are lots of non-market behaviors in social life including horizontal cooperative pattern and vertical command-style pattern which are two alternative forms of governance. Centralized dominant power is one form of vertical command-style governance structure. At the same time, experimental economics can effectively investigate individual preferences by game theory. The studies on the preferences for altruism confirm the probability of the study of centralized dominant power-dependent preferences by laboratory method while providing a useful reference game theory methods and theoretical models. This article connects preferences on centralized dominant power with methods of experimental economics, and takes the preferences under the framework of North's theoretical pattern. The article also analyses the preferences as informal social norms from the perspective of institutional economics. The experiment is designed to focus on whether the dependence of dominant power exist or not and the degree of this preference, and also individuals'goodwill for the degree of dominant power. This article assumes the affective factors of preference homogeneity within groups and heterogeneity between groups under the theoretical pattern of North, and inspects the preference evolution process of the dependence of dominant power. By experimental methods, the article concluded, individuals in the current Chinese society have good impressions and dependent preferences to centralized dominant power, and there are various degrees of this kind of preference.