Traditional Principal-agent Model Of Theory Development And Applied Research

The principal-agent theory stemmed from 1960s' late and 1970s' early is aneconomics theory. By developing about 30 years, the theory has gradually become thecore content of human resources management.However, because of the information dissymmetry and the result uncertainty of theprincipal-agent problem, harsh prior hypotheses of the principal-agent theory, andbackwardness in processing-question technology and so on, the usability and thefeasibility of the theory are not strong. For this reason, this paper makes followingworks. It makes suitable revision and the consummation in agent's risk assumption andin production function assumption. It studies the problem of controlling the fixed-pointhospital's moral hazard in the medical insurance, the problem of insurance-agentcommission system, the problem of the reasonable size population of the traditionalmanufacture enterprise, the problem of lowliest place elimination series, with theanalytic mentality of the principal-agent theory, and to give the schemes for designingthe fixed-point incentive system in the different medical services markets, the optimalform of paying commission for insurance-agent and the formulation to calculate the bestdeadline of paying commission, the formulation to estimate the reasonable sizepopulation of the traditional manufacture enterprise. It imagines using intelligencedecision support system to help the agent make rapid and scientific agency decisions,thus to enhance the usability of this theory, and to give the concrete research ideas andframework.Through deep analysing, this paper has the following innovations. WithCobb-Douglas production function, as interior variables, three factors are introducedinto the principal-agent model to establish and analyze the corresponding incentivemechanism. The three factors are the performance of the project, the ability of the agentand the degree of the agent's efforts. With the analytic mentality of the principal-agenttheory, the principal-agent problems of the insurance organization and the fixed-pointhospital in the monopoly and competitive medical services markets are studied.Meanwhile, the concrete schemes for designing the incentive system are given. The existing models of insurance-agent incentive mechanism are united through a long-termdynamic principal-agent model, and many research results are improved. Meanwhile,the optimal form of paying commission for insurance-agent and the formulation tocalculate the best deadline of paying commission are given. The principal-agent theoryis first and successfully applied into the research on the problem of the reasonable sizepopulation of the traditional manufacture enterprise and the problem of lowliest placeelimination series. Based on the Intelligence Decision Support System (IDSS), theresearch ideas and framework of the principal-agent IDSS are first given, whichprovides the scholars in this field a new perspective for future research.