Ultimate Controller, Separation Of Two Rights And Corporate Investment Decisions

Investment decision is an important strategic business decisions, agency problems on corporate investment decision-making behavior of modern corporate finance has been a main area of research. Since the 70s, gradually showing the ownership structure of central tendency, dispersion options to change ownership concentration, homogeneity by shareholders to the shareholders of heterogeneous changes, changes in the structure of ownership has brought the issue of change agent, but also changes the current corporate governance the core problem. Ownership Structure as a corporate governance structure, to determine the shareholders, as well as the majority shareholder status, leading to the shareholders to exercise their rights of ways and very different effects that can affect the behavior of corporate investment decisions, influence the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms.China's ownership structure from the point of view, the unique institutional environment has led the equity structure of listed companies in China shows a high concentration of state. On the one hand, in highly concentrated ownership structure, the controlling shareholders control the company's investment decision-making power, out of self-interest may be made to maximize the value of non-corporate investment behavior of non-efficiency; on the other hand, China's market shareholders of the company and more of the government center, state-owned property "Absence", the shareholders is difficult to form an effective constraint on the manager, more prone to excessive investment, inadequate investment and other non-efficient investment behavior; investment behavior is affecting corporate governance, corporate performance important "bridge between", the existing domestic company ownership structure literature focuses on the performance of the company in its impact on the company's ownership structure and investment behavior of Xiang Guan Xing Huan lack of research, while, from the corporate governance changes and firm performance relationship Bu Neng infer the agency nature of the problem, we must conduct inspection of corporate governance and management, such as the relationship between investment decisions. Based on the above issues, this article attempts a system based on the special background investigation focused on the equity structure, separation of ownership and the efficiency of investment and non-excessive investment. On the one hand enrich the ultimate controller of research and investment; the other hand, there are two in China to deepen the separation of ownership and listed companies on the impact of microscopic understanding of investment efficiency.Based on this, this first review of domestic and foreign research literature based on asymmetric information described, principal-agent theory and investment behavior relations, on the ultimate controller nature. separation of ownership and free cash flow, investment opportunities and investment behavior is analyzed theoretically, and propose hypotheses. Then the actual situation in our country, using data from Chinese listed companies, an empirical analysis of the nature of the ultimate controller, separation of ownership, free cash flow, investment opportunities, investment behavior of non-efficiency (over-investment) and deduce conclusions. First, compared with non-government controlled companies, government-controlled companies and investment decision more significant degree of correlation; Second, characterization of the proportion of agency conflict, control, separation of ownership and the degree of control of chain-level and non-efficiency investment decisions are related; Third, characterization of the conflict mitigation agents the right to cash flow ratio and Inefficient investment decisions negatively correlated; Forth, control the ratio of separation of ownership and control of the extent and nature of government and business efficiency of investment and over-investment in non-positive correlation with higher free cash flow of companies in more serious; Fifth, Control the ratio of separation of ownership and control of the extent and nature of government and business efficiency of investment and over-investment in non-positive correlation with lower investment opportunities in companies that are more serious.This author believes that a high concentration of shareholding enterprises not only failed to alleviate the problem of non-efficiency of investment, much more likely to major shareholders and managers conspired encroach small shareholders, further exacerbating the efficiency of corporate investment behavior of non-occurrence; addition, state-owned enterprise property rights of vacancy, resulting in the efficiency of state-owned investment holding company of non-serious. Study also found that:with the non-government control of the companies less government-controlled listed companies a greater extent if the separation of ownership and better control of the final controller Fangda right, Conger Gengwei serious cause of over-investment, increases the agency costs Guquan so greatly undermined the efficiency of corporate investment decisions and business value.