Studies On Coordination Of Three-echelon Brand Monoplization Supply Chain Based On Option Contract

Brand is the mark of enterprises and products. It strengthens enterprises' competitive power by improving the quality of products, fostering a good company image and protecting consumers'benefits. Brand monopolization is an important marketing strategy usually used in Automobile, Clothing industry etc. And the supply chain excuted brand monopolization is called Supply Chain of Brand Monopolization(SCBM).SCBM's characteristic is that the core of this kind supply chain is brand owner, who has the authority to decide the wholesale price and retail price. Usually the brand owner is the manufacturer. Therefore, Retailer's only decision is the economic order quantity, which may bring about "Double Marginalization" as other supply chains. One of effective instruments resolving this problem is supply chain coordination mechanism, which can provide information portional share and order stimulus to coordinate the whole supply chain.Option contract is a newly developing coordination mechanism, which can coordinate supply chain and evade unnecessary risk through formulating proper parameters. Futhermore, Option belongs interdisciplinary instrument, so the application in supply chain accords for the scholarly pursuits.This paper analyzes the coordination of SCBM as option is applied, and then analyzes the risk share and profit increasing after the Buy-Back is put into use. The main content and conclusions as followed:The first chapter is introduction. In this chapter, the writer analyzes the background and significance of this paper, then sums up recent studies about inclusive dealing and SCBM, and at last summarizes this paper's main study methods and innovations.The second chapter provides the concept of supply chain management, and analyzes the patnership of supply chain members. Then analyzes SCBM's coordination based on theroies. The third chapter establishes the coordination model when the two-echelon SCBM adopts options. This model, considering a manufaturer-retailer supply chain, is analyzed by game theory and supply chain coordiantion theory, and I get a conclusion that profits of this supply chain are promoted and the manufacturer and retailer's profit are also improved. Moreover, I found that option price is the make-up retailer gives to manufacturer as he provide option contract to share demand risk. Therefore, Manufacturer just need to decide the propotion to enable the coordination of supply chain. This conclusion is validated by an similar example.The fourth chapter assumes manufacturer and retailer league, then the league and supplier adopt buy-back contract. Through discussing buy-back contract's effect to supply chain profit, we find that only when the parameters {bs,ws} satisfy the optimum order quantity, supply chain will achieve optimality. Comparing with two-echelon SCBM in chapter three, three-echelon SCBM's total profits and individual profits are improved. At last, this chapter discuss the risk share under the environment of adopting option and buy-back contract.The fifth chapter discusses whether the strategy that manufacturer makes retail price is proper. Therefore, this chapter assumes a SCBM consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers. After comparing with supply chain's best retail price and retailers'best retail price, I get a conclusion that supply chain's best retail price can't maximize retailer's profit. Then discuss what if retailers decides retail price respectively by Bertrand Game Model, the emulation result demonstrates retailers would accept supply chain's best price utimately.The last chapter sum up content discussed before, and illuminate this paper's insufficiencies and innovations.