The Game Analysis Of Interest Groups In Fuel Tax Reform

Fuel Tax Reform is an important part to deepen and improve our tax system reform.However, it was failed to be implemented and been postponed for 14 years long. This is the long time dilemma where this study is starting. This paper use interest groups thoery, institutional change theory and game theory to explain the process of Fuel Tax Reform in three perspect of policy formulation, legislation and policy implementation. The result is that the reform of fuel tax has gone through three different stages of game interests, and it is the game interests that hindered the Fuel Tax Reform.Part I gives a brief description of the background, and get the start point of this study. By summarizing the lots of data, we got the public explanation of the Fuel Tax Reform, which is focus on high oil prices, the collection operation and coordination of departmental interests.Part II elaborates the interest groups analysis of Fuel Tax Reform. In the context of interest groups theory, we have subdivided the various interest groups about this reform. In this part, we also try to find the reason of the Fuel Tax Reform dilemma in collective action theory.Part III conducts this reform is both a public policy formulation and a formal institutional transition. We believe that the main power in this reform is the interest groups, and the introduction of fuel tax is the result of the game among interest groups.Part IV proposes the three different stages of the game process in Fuel Tax Reform: The game of fuel tax policy formulation, The game of institutional change in Fuel Tax Reform, and the game of fuel tax policy implementation.In the last, we got the conclusion is that the dilemma of Fuel Tax Reform result from the game among interest groups, and the Fuel Tax Reform is a process of public policy formulation, implementation, and comprehensive process of formal institutional change.