Research On Large Shareholders' Tunneling In The Perspective Of Related Party Transactions

Large shareholders' tunnelling behavior makes listed companies lost their earning capacity. Minority shareholders suffers great loss, the market loses its confident. These phenomena have restricted development of our capital market. Taking listed manufacturing companies as the research object, the dissertation analyses the existence and influencing factors of large shareholders'tunnelling behavior in the perspective of related party transactions. Based on the analysis, this dissertation gives some advices on how to decrease control shareholders'related party tractions.This dissertation uses normative study and empirical test to analyse it. In view of existing situation of large shareholders' tunnelling behavior, we analyse the reasons and existance of tunnelling behavior in theory. We also give the proper influencing factors of large shareholders'tunnelling behavior. From empircial test aspect, this dissertation analyses the existence and influencing factors of large shareholders' tunnelling behavior in the perspective of related party transactions. The main statistical methods used in the paper including:descriptive statistics analysis, correlation analysis, linear and logistic regression. Besides, we uses 2 independent samples test to analyse the effect of the split-share reform.The research shows that large shareholders use related party transactions to tunnel listed companies, decrease the value of the companies, and cause losses to the minority shareholders. Besides, the related party transactions between state-owned enterprises have more severe tunnelling property. The ownership structure of listed company, the efficiency of the board and internal incentive mechanism affect the tunneling behavior of large shareholders significantly. When the split-share reform finished, the interest of circulation shareholders and non-circulation shareholders tend to be consistent, large shareholders'tunnelling behavior's amount have reduced.This paper argues that in order to effectively restrict shareholders'tunneling behavior, we must start from the listed company itself, while strengthening the legislative and external supervision. From the listed company itself, on one hand, it should optimize the company's ownership structure, achieve full circulation and reduce state-owned shares. On the other hand, it should increase the efficiency of the board, maintain a reasonable size for the board, give full play to the independent directors of the checks and balances. From the outside, we should improve the accounting standards of related party transactions, regulate related party transactions between the state-owned enterprises. At the same time, we should strengthen supervision and increase the cost of non-compliance of listed companies.