Institutional Analysis Of Chinese Commercial Banking

The global financial crisis erupted in 2008 has brought huge impact on the world economy , it is considered that the lack of commercial banking corporate governance and the lag of commercial banking supervision are the root of this financial crisis . However , the impact of China's commercial banking sector is relatively minor . This paper attempts to explain the root of China's commercial banking sector security from the angle of public economics and institutional economics during the global financial crisis , and intends to propose the further improved measures on the imperfect of China's commercial banking system . This paper argues that China's commercial banking sector has the attribute of public goods and government supervise commercial banking in accordance with public economic mode all contributed the stable operation of China's commercial banking . Whether commercial banking system itself or the operation of commercial banking all have public goods or quasi-public goods characteristic, Chinese government supervise commercial banking all in accordance with public economic model . At present, there are many problems in decision-making mechanism , internal management mechanism and external environment of our commercial banking system , we should further reform and standardize internal and external public decision-making mechanism of our commercial banking , in order to perfect the system of commercial banking.This paper is divided into six parts:Chapter I is the preface of the paper, primarily focuses on the raised issues , the research methods , the research framework , the views and inadequate of this paper .Chapter II is literature review. The chapter analyzed the theory of institution and commercial banking system , stressing institution is crucial important in performance of socio-economics , and analysis the microeconomic system and macroeconomic system of commercial banking . It is mainly analysis the theory of property rights , enterprise systems and corporate governance theory in microeconomic system , and the theory of public choice theory in macroeconomic system .Chapter III analysis commercial banking system by the theory of public economic . This chapter analyses commercial banking system , the public goods attribute of China's commercial banking business and the decision-making mechanism of China's banking . Research shows that the key factor of Chinese commercial banks stable operation is the public goods attributes . The public policy decision mechanism of commercial banking and the system of commercial banking in Chinese commercial banking system are all collective decision-making behavior and the result of public choice .Chapter IV analysis the present situation of China's commercial banking system . This section analyzed the present situation in decision-making mechanism , property rights system , internal management mechanism and external environment of Chinese commercial banking by public economics .Chapter V is how to perfecting Chinese commercial banking system . This part puts forward the further improvement measures direct at the present situation of China's commercial banking in decision-making mechanism , property rights system , internal management mechanism and external environment . Studies suggest that , in the decision-making mechanism should gradually promote commercial banks , financial market and the social public participate in the public policy formulation . Internal management mechanism of commercial banking should be coordinated shareholders ,depositor and other stakeholders , and establish effective restraint and incentive mechanism . The external management mechanism of commercial banking should be strengthen to improve the supervision and administration , complete the relevant laws and regulations ,strengthen the construction of credit system , regulate the information disclosure system , insure the disclosure of asset quality and profitability timely, accurately and detailed , establish the regulatory system framework with incentive and restraint regulator behavior .ChapterⅥis the conclusion of this paper made a comprehensive summary of the full text .