Empirical Study Of Non-efficiency Investment Of Chinese State-owned Listed Companies

State-owned listed companies have advantage in economic and play an important role on marketing. Investment which is one of the active and long-term behaviors affects upgrade of enterprise value. Stockholder's rights structure in state-owned listed companies is different from others, such as lacking real owner and having a complex in agent。This should be great effect on non-efficiency investment. As a result, empirical study of non-efficiency investment in state-owned listed companies is significance both theory and practice.In this paper, choose Chinese state-owned listed company which issues a shares in Shanghai and Shenzhen cities for five consecutive years 2003-2007 as the data sample data, achieving 3060 datas, including 1543 datas from state-owned listed companies, in order to research three items: 1. China's state-owned listed companies invest in the existence of non-efficiency, performance, or the excessive investment and insufficient investment; 2. state-owned listed companies are state-owned shares if the proportion of non-efficiency of investment behavior influential; 3. analysis of state-owned listed companies in other non-efficiency of investment behavior impact factor.Empirical part of this paper is mainly divided into two parts: the first part, with reference to Vogt (1994) regarding investment efficiency model, add the proportion of state-owned shares and the first two indicators of the proportion of large shareholders, listed companies are state-owned investment-related test, analysis of state-owned shares proportion of the impact on investment decision-making state-owned listed companies, as well as non-efficient types of investments. The second part is the analysis of state-owned listed companies invest in non-efficiency factors, respectively, from the degree of concentration of ownership, financing constraints, as well as state-owned assets management system, such as three-pronged analysis of these factors for state-owned listed companies and non-efficient investment.The main conclusions of this thesis are: 1. China's state-owned listed companies exist clear principal-agent problem, there has been the phenomenon of over-investment; 2. Stake in the more centralized state-owned listed companies over-invest in the more serious phenomenon; 3. China's state-owned listed companies and other listed companies compared to non-existent financing obvious constraints; 4. share reform, the state-owned listed companies and investment behavior of non-efficiency has improved. Finally article for empirical findings of the study, from China's state-owned listed companies qualified to shape the main state-owned shareholders, a moderate reduction of state-owned shares to reduce stake in listed companies as well as deepen the degree of concentration of state-owned commercial banks companies in three areas of reform, such as make policy recommendations.