A Empirical Study On The Effects Of Board Characteristics On Earnings Informativeness Based On Stock Equity Structure

As the core of corporate governance, Board of Directors has direct responsibility for supervision of the quality of accounting information, to a certain extent, reasonable and effective governance mechanisms from the Board of Directors can control managers' behavior of earnings management, and improve the credibility of accounting earnings information, in order to improve accounting earnings informativeness. As a result, the relationship between the characteristics of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness is a problem is worthy of in-depth discussion, and whether this relationship will be different as a result of the difference of ownership structure has yet to be tested, this article attempts to answer above two questions.Based on the relative literature review and theoretical analysis, this article discusses the relationship between the characteristics of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness by using Chinese listed companies' data in 2005. The course of the study on the structural characteristics of the Board of Directors and behavioral characteristics takes into account the Impact of stock equity structure, and tests two types of features on the earnings informativeness by using the respective groups test and three-cross test model. To the quality characteristics of Board of Directors, this article does not consider the effect of ownership structure, using a two interactive test model to test that relationship. The study found: (1) Between structural characteristics of the Board of Directors, scales of Board of Directors and earnings informativeness have significantly positive correlation, to the Non-state-owned Holding Companies, the size of the Board of Directors has more evident influence on earnings informativeness; to the State-controlled Companies, between CEO duality and earnings informativeness have a significant negative correlation; and between the proportion of State-owned Holding Companies' independent directors and earnings informativeness have a significantly positive correlation. (2) In the behavioral characteristics of the Board, the number of the annual meetings of State-controlled Companies' board directors has a significantly positive correlation with earnings informativeness. (3) In the quality characteristics of the Board of Directors, the proportion of financial professional directors in Board of Directors does not have significant correlation with earnings informativeness, and the proportion of salted Directors has a significantly positive correlation with earnings informativeness. Finally, this article puts forward policy recommendations in the light of the conclusions.