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Accounting Policies Choices Based On Stakeholder Theory

Posted on:2010-09-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L L LuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360278451623Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Different accounting policy choice will produce different accounting information, so it impacts the different stakeholders'interest of the Listed Companies. Different stakeholders have different benefit motivation by accounting policy choice. Therefore, its results are decided by stakehold- ers'game. On the basis of making a thorough review of research on the accounting policy choice at both home and abroad, and clarifying the fundamental problems of choice of accounting policy, the paper uses the different stakeholders'interest to analyze the influence of every stakeholder's choice of accounting policy in Chinese Listed Company. Then, it analyses the relation between stockholders,government,creditors and Listed Company in game theory .Under modern enterprise system, because the rights of ownership and management are separated,the managers possess the residual rights of control ,so the game of stockholder and Listed Company actually is the game of stockholder and manager. Because equity structures of ownership is possessed by government in Chinese Listed Companies and accounting policy is managed by government as the macro manager , game of government and listed companies is divided into two levels: the game of State-owned stockholders and managers of Listed Companies, the game of accounting policy supply side and the implementation side. In addition, creditors can protect their interest by debt contract, but operators who serve the interests of shareholders have the motivation in which they can use the way of increasing shareholders value through decreasing the debt value to transfer creditors'treasure to stockholders'hand, and the motivation can result in the game of mangers and creditors. By analyzing the influence of every stakeholder's choice of accounting policy in Chinese Listed Company, the research result shows that information asymmetry bring on stakeholder's position difference about listed company's accounting policy choice, its outcome is decided by the game of every stakeholder. The stakeholders who are biased by game ending will gain the greater part of"public lease"which is left by accounting standard makers. Thus, it can be seen that the accounting policy choice of Chinese Listed Company have the color of opportunism, aiming to this problem, we put forward some suggestions that can standard the accounting policy choice of Chinese Listed Company.
Keywords/Search Tags:Accounting policy choice, Stakeholders, Game-theoretic analysis
PDF Full Text Request
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