This research topic started from studying foreign corporate governance modes,then analyzed the reform practice of stock system and board of directors of state-owned enterprises, and considered the structure of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative to be the core of the reform of state-owned enterprises.On the basis of reviewing the development course of governance structure of state-owned enterprises,we deeply analyzed the structure of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative,adopted the method of permutation and combination and logistic elimination to select three ideal structures from twenty-four reasonable structures,and then established a "logistic" regression model to empirically analyze the governance structure of listed companies,and finally reached the conclusions.The topic is constituted by five parts:Part one:Introduction.At first,we introduced the background of the reform of state-owned enterprises,and then brought forth the research background,research thoughts, research methods,research contents and research target.Part two:We reviewed the theories of corporate governance and the basis of them, emphatically studied the corporate governance modes and corporate governance structures of state-owned enterprises and analyzed the structure modes of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative.Part three:We adopted the principle of permutation and combination to enumerate all of the structures of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative, then analyzed their advantages and disadvantages,selected three ideal structures,and put forward the criteria of personnel recruitment.Part four:Empirical study on the relation between chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative and corporate performance.We selected the data of listed companies from 2004 to 2006 to research the relation between chairman of the board, general manager and corporate legal representative and corporate performance.Finally we drew the conclusion that the ability of holding shares,the ability of state holding,and enterprise scale have significant effect on the structures of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative,and to some extent the structures of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative affect the corporate performance.Part five:Conclusions.We draw five conclusions as follows:1) the structure allocation of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative is the core of the reform of state-owned enterprises;2) there are ten feasible structure modes of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative;3) the ability of share control,the ability of state-owned share control and the scale of the enterprise have significant influence on the structure allocation of chairman of the board,general manager and corporate legal representative;4) it is appropriate that adopting different structure modes in different phases of an enterprise' s lifecycle;5) choosing a person to be chairman of the board,general manager or corporate legal representative should consider personal disposition,industrial background,knowledge structure,the phase of the enterprise' s lifecycle,and other factors. |