The Mathematical Study On Application Of Second Degree Price Discrimination Based On Different Demand Condition

There are many articles in which the theory of second price discrimination has been deeply researched in recent years. At present, there are two ways to study the theory. One is to study the problem of monopoly manufacturer how to compartmentalize its demand section under the certain demand function. The other way is to study the problem of monopoly manufacturer how to actualize second price discrimination with the fixed discount rate under linear demand function. Based on the important results obtained from the present research on second degree price discrimination, this dissertation makes a systemic and more practical mathematics study on the side of the manufacturer angels, including further and more deeply research on monopoly manufacturer how to actualize second price discrimination under nonlinear demand function, Nash equilibrium of second degree price discrimination under the condition of competition with different demand functions, monopoly manufacturer how to actualize second price discrimination under uncertain demand function, and gives the model of second price discrimination under generic uncertain demand function, educes a series of important conclusions.The dissertation includes five parts. The chapter one is introduction. This part introduces the research background, the practical significance, the summary of domestic and foreign research literature, the research content, the innovations of the dissertation and the main conclusions used in the dissertation. The chapter two researches monopoly manufacturer how to actualize second price discrimination under the condition of a sort of typical nonlinear demands, provides the model of monopoly manufacturer how to actualize second price discrimination with the unfixed discount rate under nonlinear demand function, confirms the feasibility of the model with computer simulation, and educes a series of important conclusions finally. The chapter three researches second price discrimination when two competition manufacturers make n th-pricing with the complete static games model, gives Nash equilibrium under this condition. Nash equilibrium indicate that the being of Nash equilibrium depends on the occupancy rates of two manufacturers, and condition of Nash equilibrium being requires that the occupancy rates of manufacturers are nearer when the number of compartmentalizing its demand section become more. The chapter four extends second price discrimination of monopoly manufacturer under the certain demand function to the uncertain demand function, and deeply researches the model of second price discrimination under linear uncertain demand function, confirms the feasibility of the model with computer simulation, gives the model of second price discrimination under generic uncertain demand function, and confirms the feasibility of the model strictly. The chapter five is conclusion of the dissertation.