The Research On Managers' Adverse Accounting Behavior Of Listed Company In China

In the modern capital market, the listed company is the main body, but the listed company's internal operations are controled by managers. As the entrusted party of stakeholders of the specialized assets, managers are undertaking the responsibility of operating assets and making it value-added. Because of this, managers have the incomparable advantage of information like operation performance for asset management and quality situation. But these information is prodused by accounting procedures step by step, from the first choice of accounting policy to the later books, and released by accounting report forms eventually. Therefore the managers'choice of accounting management is affecting the accounting information supply, determining the quantity and quality of information what stakeholders harvest, and affecting the interests and decision-making of stakeholders. This paper studies of Chinese listed company's managers bad accounting behavior, it has five parts.The first part is the introduction, mainly elaborating the background and the meaning of the subject, the related literature review, structure and the major innovation and deficiency, it is the matting and brief introduction of main content follow-up.The second part are related theories of managers'accounting behaviors, here include three aspects. The first aspect is the content of managers'accounting behavior, respectively expounds "accounting behavior" and "managers'accounting behavior". The second aspect is the necessity of existence of managers'accounting behavior, including four reasons, as corporate governance structure with two rights separation, the manager's rational economic status, information asymmetry and incomplete contract. And the third aspect is about the two aspects of the managers'accounting behavior, the good aspect and the bad aspect, distinguished by the different influence to stakeholders, and further determine the subject of this paper, it's" the managers'bad accounting behavior."The third part are the background and performance of Chinese listed company's managers'bad accounting behavior. It's about the specific performance of manager[s bad accounting behavior in the concrete background of Chinese share-trading reform, government behavior, securities market, managers market and the listed company's internal governance structure. Here according to the old enterprise accounting standards and the new enterprise accounting standards, the performance further classified into two different aspects, mainly because the new standards has greatly modification of the old one, to a certain extent limiting the managers'bad accounting behavior, but on the other hand, giving new space for managers'bad accounting behavior.The fourth part is about the Chinese listed company's managers'bad accounting behavior's influence on stakeholders, here first expounding the category of stakeholders, the concept of stakeholder is broad, as long as the one has interest transaction with the company, it can be named as stakeholders, but the influence can be different, here stakeholders are only five aspects: stockholders, creditors, managers, government and other stakeholders. Then respectively expounding the managers'bad accounting behavior's negative effection to different stakeholders, as misleading investors'decision-making, improving creditors'credit risk, as well as making government's macro-control mechanism a failure, making audit institutions'work more difficult.The fifth part is about the management measures to Chinese listed companie's managers'bad accounting behavior, here it basically distinguished to two aspects to improve including the internal environment and external environment of the listed company. The internal environment's improvement is mainly about clarifying the company's property and deepening perfecting the internal management mechanism. The external environment's improvement includs further restriction of government's misconduction, strengthening the government's administrative supervision, economic and legal supervision for securities market and Listed company, and setting up standard manager market, accountant market and auditor market. Thus, in combination, the managers'accounting behavior can be more standard. But as a big stakeholder, the managers always have motive to do bad accounting behavior, so in a long period, how to minimize the negative effection of the managers'bad accounting behavior is a difficult subject worth studying.