The Research About Supply Chain Coordination Of Short-Life-Cycle Products Based On Order Lead-Time Reduction

We address the challenge in dealing with the short-life-cycle product that is characterized by the uncertain demand and the single-cycle with several selling periods,and study the decision behaviors of agents on supply chain under four representative operation settings according to the thought of progressive extension.For each setting,the behavior of a risk-neutral centralized supply chain is optimized in the expected profit as a benchmark,then a feasible contract is designed for the decentralized supply chain system consisted of one supplier and one retailer,which can motivate the agents who maximize their own expected profit respectively to make the same decisions as the centralized system does.Concretely,our contributions are as following:(1) Supply chain coordination about demand forecast accuracy changing with the order lead-time reduction.The profits of whole supply chain and dealer are increasing with the order lead-time reduction,but order quantities of dealer are reducing,which make all ventures transfer to manufacturer. In order to prompting manufacturer production positivity,the chapter adopt the benefit-sharing contract to let dealer and manufacturer share the profits of whole supply chain, consequently,making supply chain arrive at coordinate,and finding the range of benefit-allotting coefficient is shrunk with the order lead-time reduction.(2) Supply chain coordination about demand forecast accuracy and production cost changing with the order lead-time reduction.Although reducing order lead time can improve demand forecast accuracy of the dealer,it may increase production cost of manufacturer.The effects of reducing order lead time on profits of supply chain members under decentralization decision-making are analyzed,and the benefit-sharing contract which may make supply chain coordination realize is proposed.(3) Supply chain coordination about demand forecast accuracy and wholesale price changing with the order lead-time reduction.This chapter studies the wholesale price and demand prediction accuracy are changing with lead-time compression,lead-time compression improves the accuracy of demand forecasts of dealer,but manufacturers bear more risks,so manufacturers raise wholesale prices.Manufacturers are leaders who first gave wholesale prices increment to maximize their profits,dealer are followers,in accordance with the increment,to decide Ordering time and Ordering quantity,the game equilibrium solutions are gained by using backward induction.(4) Supply chain benefit-sharing contract with asymmetry information based on order lead-time reduction.Reseached Benefit-sharing contracts about increased production cost are symmetry information and asymmetry information,results prove that benefit-sharing contract in symmetry information can arrive at the whole supply chain coordination,but in asymmetry information,in order to inspiriting manufacturer,dealer have to pay out costs for not observing manufacturer increased production costs,result in profit decline,the other way round,the profits of manufacturer enhance because private informations.