Study On The Question Of China's Commercial Medical Insurance Market In The Asymmetric Information

In recent years, with the development of social economy and the enhancement of people's income, people gradually think a lot of the health and risk insurance of themselves. On one hand, people improve their need of medical treatment greatly, because of the trend that people live older and older, the change of disease list, the deterioration of the environment and the application of new medical equipment and technology, so that it cause the swift increase of the medical cost, more and more people can't bear the more and more expensive medical cost any longer. On the other hand, with the gradual deepening of the reform of the medical insurance rule, the situation of medical treat at public expense has been broken; the situation that the government supported the medical cost has been as the history. These all give a perfect opportunity to develop commercial medical insurance. Determined by the comparatively low levels of the productivity forces now, China's social medical insurance is and will remain pretty limited for quite a long time. So the commercial health insurance is becoming more and more important. But the actuality of the commercial health insurance in China is not so gratifying----Civilians can't obtain a practical medical guarantee although they have a rising consuming demand, the insurance companies actively invest in this market but it is hard to profit, and the country is facing up a difficulty that there is no guarantees for a serious disease after medical innovation. The main reason for the dilemma is that the asymmetrical information in the commercial health insurance market leads to some problems of reversed choice and moral hazard. How to establish a restrict system about the behavior of reversed choice and moral hazard? Now it is becoming the urgent problem in China. It is also the theme of this thesis.At first We analyze the asymmetrical information in the commercial health insurance market,The thesis points that the moral hazard and the adverse election is the arch criminal that block the development of medical insurance, and analyzes and demonstrates how do the moral hazard and the adverse election come in being form conception characteristic and present difficulty of the commercial medical insurance. Then, the paper analyzes the moral hazard and the adverse election in the commercial health insurance market by principal-agent model and R-S model, modifies principal-agent model, and draws a conclusion:whether information symmetry or not, insurance company and policy-holder both benefit,if studious cost function become:policy-holder spend a part of expected utility in caring for his boby(action directly connect with profits), policy-holder is more careful of body himself,decrease disease rate, decrease insurance company's satisfaction of a claim and increase company's profits.In the end , the paper supports some idiographic measures and feasible plan to keep away the moral hazard and the adverse election aim at the actual circumstances in china at present from government and medical insurance company。But, because it is very professional that the medical insurance is and the correlative academic research is still behindhand,the author hopes the paper can lead that more and more people in insurance field can pay more attention to the problem about the insurance risk control, research and establish a perfect control system against the risk of the moral hazard and the adverse election, and accelerate the healthy development of the commercial medical insurance in our country.