Research On Chinese Small And Medium-sized Joint-stock Banks' Related Lending To Shareholders

With the increasing proportion of indirect financing in financial market, related transactions between enterprises and banks have developed gradually. Considered as one of the primary representations of related transactions, related lending can to some extent reduce transaction cost between banks and enterprises, but it more often caused much risk to bank loan. In recent years, the problem of related lending to shareholders has seriously influenced Chinese small and medium-sized joint-stock banks' (small and medium-sized banks for short below) development, though many scholars have done some research on the problem of related lending, it is difficult to find the literatures which systematically study Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.The main research clue of this dissertation is from theoretical foundation to the universality and the particularity, and finally to the root and various conducting ways of small and medium-sized banks' related lending. The concrete research contents are as follows:Firstly, this dissertation makes a literature review from three different angles, namely, related lending and asymmetric information mitigation, related lending and interest entrenchment and formation mechanism of related lending, sequentially we introduce research project of this dissertation, namely, the problem of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.Secondly, this dissertation expounds theoretical foundation of related lending from three aspects, namely, transaction cost theory, property right theory and corporate governance theory, subsequently this dissertation analyzes the universality of related lending, then from both positive and negative side, we expound the particularity of small and medium-sized banks' related lending which is different from large banks.Thirdly, in the principal part of this dissertation. through theoretical model, this dissertation designs revenue functions of both bank manager and shareholder in the process of small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders. Analysis results indicate that the root of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders lies in the controlling power of large shareholders and hence the firing menace to bank manager. In the process of solving the theoretical model, meanwhile we analyze the influence of related lending to shareholders on interrelated interestors of small and medium-sized banks. And then we do further research and point out various realistic conducting ways through which the above root will finally result in related lending to shareholders. In addition, we analyze the case of Minsheng Bank' related lending to shareholders and further indicate the risk of Chinese small and medium-sized banks' related lending to shareholders.Finally this dissertation puts forward some related policy recommendations to deal with related lending to shareholders from both inside and outside of small and medium-sized banks.