Preferring Equity Capital On IPO Activities By State-Owned Corporations And Governance

The financing order of China's listed companies is inconsistent with that of developed country. However, the study on financing behavior of China's listed companies from the economic analysis aspect are lacked deeply in our country, and doing comparative analysis with financing behavior of developed country. Choosing the preferring equity capital's problem of China's state-owned listed enterprise is as research object of the thesis. The main problem includes: the financing background and efficiency of state-owned listed enterprise, how to deprive exterior investor's benefit through preferring equity capital, how to design one kind of governance mechanism to solve this problem.Through establishing theoretical model, shows the reason why Chinese listed companies have a widespread preference for equity financing. The reason is that given the financing amount, outside equity financing could minimize the issuing proportion to outside investors and maximize the issuing price of equity financing, and the interest of outside shareholders is deprived through this way. We have introduced the manager competition in this foundation, designed a mechanism of pre-restraints and afterwards interference, And the presented model can make the behavior of preference for equity financing endogenous, and give some policy suggestions on how to solve the problem of equity Financing Preference.