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The Research On Controlling Shareholders' Tunneling And Influential Factors Of The Listed Companies In China

Posted on:2008-01-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z P XiangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360242965224Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The theory of traditional corporate governance focuses on the agent relations between managements and shareholders within a company for a long time. However, the results of some newly research show that the major part of companies' ownership structure is relative concentrative instead of much dispersive all over the world, which result in interests conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders besides the controlling shareholder take use of their control rights to harm interests of listed companies and the minority shareholders by so-called Tunneling, which become a common phenomenon of corporate governance. Therefore, research into the controlling shareholders' Tunneling, which means a lot, not only the valuable accumulation in the theory of corporate governance but also in practices the strategies to prevent and govern the controlling shareholders' Tunneling.Based on the previous studies, facing the facts of the listed companies in china, this thesis firstly introduce the controlling shareholders' Tunneling and summarize ways,reasons and harm of the controlling shareholders' Tunneling in china. Secondly, analysis the controlling shareholders' Tunneling by set model and make exploration in measure of the controlling shareholders' Tunneling under the thoughts. Then explore the possible influential factors to the controlling shareholders' Tunneling in china by empirical study, which involve the panel data from 718 listed companies from 2004-2006 years and the fields of fund impropriation, associated transaction, cash dividend and senor management personnel' salary. On the whole, the outcome of the empirical study show that the concentration in ownership structure and the share segregation encourage the controlling shareholders' Tunneling, it is in contrast with that the lack of efficiency with the internal and external governance to the listed companies, which can not restrain the Tunneling efficiently. At last, make the exploration in prevention and governance with the controlling shareholders' Tunneling, introduce some policy suggestions, and come to comprehensive conclusion to the thesis, point limitations of the study and direction of further research.
Keywords/Search Tags:Controlling shareholders, Tunneling, Control rights, Share segregation, Random effects
PDF Full Text Request
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