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The Research On CPA Audit Quality Based On Principal-Agent Relationship

Posted on:2009-12-08Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Q LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189360242492475Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
At present, the relationship of Principal- Agent theory and auditing quality issues in the listed companies has become China's hot theoretical problem, which is a major concern in capital markets, government regulators and corporate governance. This article explores the factors which influence the quality of auditing including internal factors and environmental factors, and it helps to provide a theoretical basis for analysis of auditing quality when using Principal-Agency model and Game model. At the same time, it is also made to propose policy recommendations about improving auditing quality.In the process of analyzing poor quality of China's CPA auditing, this article is on the use of standardized methods to study the problems. For the topics of research, it raises two questions: First, in the auditing process, whether the Principal-Agency relationship is alienated between the investors (clients), CPA and the management of listed companies; second, how are the different parties gaming between the relations. Aiming at these problems, through the establishment of clients and the CPA's game model, the research reveals the economics source of the CPA auditing quality issues, and puts forward the policy recommendations.
Keywords/Search Tags:CPA Auditing, Auditing quality, Principal-Agent Relationship, Game
PDF Full Text Request
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