Empirical Study On The Stock Rights Incentive Effects Of Listed Company Managements In China

Since Berle and Means put forward the classical thesis that mordent enterprises are characterized"ownership and management right separate from each other"in 1932, stock rights incentive on managements become the key problems in the enterprises development and corporate governance interested by people more and more. The stock rights incentive on managements means that the listed companies use their corporate stocks as target and make long stimulation to the directors, supervisors and top management. It is envisioned for the future and connect the manager's expected return with his contribution to the company's future performance, which is a method that coordinate the fundamental interests between stockholders and managers. Thus, it effectively excites the enthusiasm and creativeness of human resources and eliminates the"agent risk"to a certain extent.This paper is based on discussing and dissecting theoretical basis and practice effect interrelated with stock rights incentive, intending to bring out the actual effects produced by applying stock rights incentive on managements in the listed companies by means of positive analysis and find out deep factors which could influence the effects according to positive analysis results. In the process of positive analysis, this paper research the relationship of managements stock holdings and enterprise's performance after controlling the influence produced by factors such as enterprise character , by the sample of the listed companies which carried out stock rights incentive from 2002 to 2007 in China, dividing into former and latter stages with the stock right splitting reform, adopting descriptive statistic analysis and using least square method and correlation test and so on. Research result on two stages is that there isn't remarkable relationship between managements stock holdings and enterprise's performance, explain the reason to the result on each stage respectively. At last, this paper put forward relevant suggestion and countermeasures against the underlying reason that restrict the full play by managements stock holdings in our country.