A Study On The Relationship Between Controlling Rights Allocation And Performance Of China's Listed Companies

Controlling rights is a very complex concept, and it is a key factor for the capital market and corporate governance. The research papers are generally based on two perspectives to study on it: the market of corporate controlling rights and the controlling rights allocation. This paper is based on the latter. The main objective of this paper is to discuss the problems of the controlling rights allocation of China's listed companies, and how to optimize the controlling rights allocation to improve the corporate performance.The definition of the corporate controlling right in this paper is the power to have influence on corporate decisions. It is multi-dimensional and can be controlled by different parts respectively. In modern corporate enterprises, the controlling rights are generally mastered by the shareholders, board and managers. So the paper analyzes the controlling rights on these three parts. Then the paper establishes the comprehensive model of the controlling rights and does some empirical analysis based on China's listed companies. Through the theoretical and empirical analysis, we find out the China's listed companies'controlling rights allocation mode and the problems in it.The paper's main conclusion is that the governance structure of board and the leader structure of manager have no obvious influence on corporate performance. The corporate governance relationship is not clear. Power balance mechanism is failed. The function of the board is replaced by the highly focused ownership structure. The controlling shareholder who holds high percentage shares played the main role in corporate performance in our country now. From the real controlling rights allocation situation, the boards have the characteristic of independence or power balance. But this is just on the surface. It has not played positive influences for corporate performance. Corporate performances of companies which the shares are highly held by one holder are better than the companies which the shares are scattered relatively and have the controlling power separation mechanism in china now. These conclusions show that to optimize the corporate controlling rights allocation mode of our country's listed company is very urgent and crucial for the improvement of corporate performance. This paper suggests three policy proposals for solve this problem based on the research conclusions in the last chapter.