The Study Of The Principal-Agent Problem Of Logistics Outsourcing And Risk Prevention

The third party logistics (3PL) industry sprung up and developed just more than ten years ago in our country. To be the most beneficial business form to develop economy, logistics have been in the difficulties to carry on these years in our country. The Chinese enterprises refuse it but have to face to the desire of this kind of business form, because of fearing the indetermination of cooperation. The indetermination brings certain risks to both cooperation parties. During the cooperation, the outsourcing enterprise's (principal) benefits depend on the activities of the 3PL enterprise (agent) to carry out. Generally the outsourcing enterprise doesn't participate the operation management decision of the 3PL enterprise. This give the 3PL enterprise opportunity to conceal the informations and activities to the outsourcing enterprise. When both parties' benefits are not in accord, the 3PL enterprise can use this kind of dissymmetric information to make an disadvantageous activity choice to the outsourcing enterprise, so the moral risk is produced now.This text will make use of the game theory and the information economics theory, from the angle of principal-agent relationship, to analyse the risk of logistics outsourcing. Actually the 3PL demonstrate the cooperative relationship between the enterprises, namely principal-agent relationship. In the first this text will make use of the most simple game model, complete information static model, to analyse Nash equilibrium of logistics outsourcing cooperation; then under the hypothetic condition of information dissymmetry, it will analyse thoroughly with moral risk model of information dissymmetry theory; finally combining the result of model analysis, it will introduce pointed measures of risk defence.