The Study On The Logic And Supervision Of Government-Style Taxation Loss In China

Taxation loss is a common issue of all the countries in the world. There are two kinds of taxation loss, that is,'Government style'and'non-government style'. Because most of the theorists tend to make an assumption that government stands for the social interest and works for it, all the studies that make inquiry into the taxation loss only pay attention to the non-government style taxation loss, the thesis of related studies is to reduce the taxation evasion by strengthening the taxation administration institution. In fact, as the decisions of public policies and governors of taxation collecting, there is possibility that individuals in public sector have an incentive to reduce the taxation, and the negative effects originated from government-style taxation loss are greater than that from private taxation evasion. For the reasons stated above, this article has made an inquiry into the logic of government-style taxation loss and the choice of related institutions and has great significance for the control of the government-style taxation loss in China.This paper includes five parts:After the general concept and the harm of taxation loss are stated, turn our aim to the government-style taxation loss in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 has evaluated the scale of government-style taxation loss approximately made an analysis on the harm of loss and the pressing of supervision on it. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, the key parts of this article, have made a study on the logic of government-style taxation loss. Divide the loss into the loss related to corruption and rent-seeking and the loss related to taxation competition among governments. Firstly, for the first kind of loss, it is related to taxation administrators and the decisions of policies collude with private individuals and do harm to social interest. It shows: the social effects related to corruption and rents seeking all are negative and originate from the power and asymmetrical information. Secondly, as for the taxation loss related to taxation competition, it results from the contest among the governmental sector for economic interest and (or) taxation interest. Divide it into horizontal taxation competition, vertical taxation competition and international taxation competition. There are great differences among the logic of taxation loss that result from different taxation competition. The main reason for the taxation loss result from horizontal taxation competition is the lack of reasonable institution that defines the taxation competition. The basic problem related vertical taxation is the unsuitable power arrangement between central and local government. As for the international taxation competition, the key issue is the lack of international coordinating mechanism.Based the conclusions derived from positive analysis, the last part of this paper (Chapter 5) make suggestion on the institutional arrangement that control the government-style taxation loss. It shows: Firstly, as for the control and administration of the government-style taxation loss, we should make a difference between the corruption-resulting loss and the one related taxation competition. The former style should be eradicated wholly, as for the latter; we should make difference between good competition and bad competition. Secondly, we should make a suitable arrangement of government power, such as the fiscal power between local and central government. Based on power arrangement, A set of effective decisional mechanism made individuals use power reasonably is needed, such as incentive mechanism.For the subject of this paper is government-style taxation loss, compared with the studies focused on non-government style loss, this paper put forward a new subject. As for the shortcomings, the main aspects include lack of detail statistical data.