Research On Related-party Guarantee Of Listed Companies From The Perspective Of Corporate Governance

This paper, regarding last guarantee policy as background and using related-party guarantee data in 2004 and 2005, investigates the influence of peculiar ownership structure of listed company and institutional environment on the related-party guarantee from the company in the hope of offering an empirical evidence for ultimate shareholder tunneling the listed companies. The result suggests that the wedge between voting rights and cash flow rights, the scale of board of directors and the proportion of directors holding a post in the companies have a remarkably positive correlation to the proportion of related-party guarantee; the scale of the assets negative. Through further analysis, we find that the motive of ultimate owners tunneling the interests of listed companies derives from the separation of control rights and ownership, the proportion of director holding a post makes the holding shareholder possess the ability influencing the listed company. Meanwhile, the large scale of board of directors reduces its efficiency, the independent directors do not work well yet, and still the environment entails improvement. Several kinds of factors are synthesized together, make related-party guarantee of the listed companies remain incessant after repeated prohibition. For this reason, this text advises that the supervision departments strengthen the concern about pyramid ownership enterprises, strengthen the independence of the board of directors, and perfect the laws and regulations to restrain the holding shareholders from tunneling the listed companies.