As our country economical unit representative , the performance of the listed companies directly reflect the development trend of Chinese economy. In our country,the problem of executives incentive of listed company is always the focus of the society. The paper research subject is proposed under this kind of background, its basic goal lies in through the empirical research on relationship analysis between executives compensation incentive and the enterprise performance to discovers the influence factor and the incentive effect of executives' compensation incentive, thus discovers the problems and proposed the policy suggestions to improve and promotes the rationalization of compensation incentive in listed company.The study is on the foundation of relative foreign theory and certain research fruit of the inner scholars proposed five assumptions and set up model to analyze and examine them: Fristly, analysis the short time incentive and a long time incentive , then according to the company's different scale, the state-owned stock proportion, the competition degree divide into groups and carry on the analysis separately.Through studying, this paper draws the analysis conclusion as following: First, executives annual pay and enterprise performance present more obvious positive correlation. Second,there is prominent relevance between compensation and enterprise performance in the listed company if executives holds stock, But there have no relations between the value of stock that executives holds and enterprise performance. Third, the listed company's scale and the incentive mechanism presents a reverse relations. Fourth, the state-owned stock larger in proportion, the worse in relevance between executives' compensation and enterprise performance is, presents reverse relations. Fifth ,in the different competition degree of the listed company, the compactness of executives compensation and enterprise performance of the general competition trade must strong to free competition trade, but that in monopoly profession are independent.After relationship analysis, this article thought the short-term incentive which the listed company pays great attention to started to display affects; Executives holds the stock causes the contractual relationship to be more perfect, it helped to enhances the relevance of executives' compensation and enterprise performance, but the long-term incentive mechanism is insufficient consummation, the emphasis has not put in the key competitiveness and long-term development in the future; The compensation-performance agreement is being set up in the small-scale listed company, But still needed to consummate,that on the large-scale and medium-sized listed company has not been reached yet; It must make the proportion of the state-owned stock control within the specific limits to enable couraging measure being effective; More serious incentive problem exist in the listed company, the origin lies in the excessive competition exists in some competitive trades of china. Executives' compensation is decided by market environment or other factors.In view of the above conclusion, the author think must strengthen company control and strengthen the relationship between compensation incentive and enterprise performance. The paper point out what factor should consider and propose the measures in strengthen relevance. |