Game Analysis Of The K-price (k≥1) Sealed Auction

The auction theory has been one of the most important and attractive subjects since 1970s, gaining the in-depth development. With the construction and further improvement of social market economy, auction and bidding have become the indispensable system in China. Due to the advantages of publicity,equity,impartiality ,auction and bidding have acquired the recognition of average people. At present, the main researches about auction and bidding are focusing on the conditions,methods,process and so on, instead of making use of the modern economic theory to analyze the problems. So there are some disadvantages.This thesis analyzes the equilibrium bid on the k-price(k>l) sealed auction. Through the study about this behavior of efficiently selecting the exchange objective, we hope that we can offer the helpful suggestions and references for the bidders about how to bid and government about how to design auctions in order to show the benefits from auction and bidding.Firstly, this thesis analyzes the bids of the first and second sealed auction under the condition of complete information. Secondly, on the basis of the static game theory of incomplete information and adopting the method of order statistics, this thesis works out the equivalent bids of the first,second and third sealed auction while the private valuations of all bidders accord with the common distributing. The bidding models are set up under the supposition of the symmetric independent private values (SIPV) with risk-neutral agents. At the same time, this paper using the previously method analyzes the equivalence of payment and the optimal reserved price of auctioneer from bidding aspect.At last, on the assumption of the symmetric independent private values, we figure out the equilibrium bid of the k-price(k>l) sealed auction that all bidders' valuations are uniformly distributed on the support [0,1].