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Influence Of The Internal Governance Structure Of Family Holding Listed Companies On The Business Value

Posted on:2011-07-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:H M HeFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189330338982503Subject:Accounting
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The family holding listed companies that develops swiftly and violently in our country have been playing a significant role in the economy. As family businesses are unique, the family holding listed companies, on the surface show the same with the general governance structure of listed companies, but the general principal-agent theory also difficult to explain their internal governance issues. However, the current domestic listed corporate governance structure of the family is still the main application of principal-agent theory to its analysis. In addition, the researches on taking family listed companies as a single sample is very less and most of them use data out of date, and lack of convincing. On the other hand, at present, when researching the corporate governance and performance of the listed companies, domestic scholar emphasize particularly on the relationship of the stock rights structure and performance of the company, especially of the centralization of stock rights and company's performance, and have not achieved a consist conclusion. So this paper take the family holding listed companies as the object, using stewardship theory which is supported by agency theory and 2004-2007 data for empirical analysis, researching the relationship between corporate governance and performance of a family holding listed company.In this study,Tobin'Q is chosen as company performance variables. Corporate governance is characterized by ten attributes, which are the cashflow rights, the separation rate, largest proportion of shareholding, the proportion of the top five shareholders hold, the proportion of circulation shares, acquisition of control, the size of the directorate, the number of family directors, the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board, the size of board of supervisors. Meanwhile, firm leverage, income from principal operations and firm size are chosen as the control variables. This study is based on a sample of 110 Chinese family holding listed companies. The results indicate that the proportion of cashfolw rights, the separation rate, the proportion of the top five shareholders hold, the proportion of circulation shares and acquisition of control are significantly and positively related to the company performance, the proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on the board have upside down U shape with the company performance, while the coefficients of the other independent variables are insignificant. Based on the empirical evidences, this paper provides some advice on improving Chinese family holding listed companies'performance.
Keywords/Search Tags:Family Holding Listed Companies, Corporate Governance, Stewardship Theory, Business Value
PDF Full Text Request
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