Empirical Study On Ownership Structure, CEO Compensation And Performance Of China's Listed Banks

After the full opening of China's financial markets, increased competition between domestic and foreign banks. In essence, this competition is competition of modern banking system. the core of the modern banking system is modern banking corporate governance mechanism. Therefore, the governance structure's optimization is the only way improving our country commercial bank competition.The Commercial banks take a kind of special company, both universality having general company and have whose particularity. In current to corporate governance structure question research results, what the domestic and foreign academic circle more pay attention is the enterprise, specially to be listed corporate governance structure, but the discussion of governance of commercial banks is relatively few. Based on this, this article, in governs to the bank company carries on the theoretical analysis in the foundation, goes on the market the national joint stock system commercial bank's data using Shanghai and Shenzhen, to our country in the city bank stockholder's rights structure and the performance, the CEO compensation and the performance's relations has conducted empirical study.The evidence suggests that larger proportion of the largest stock-hold, balances capacity of the largest stock-hold and higher ownership concentration hinder the bank to improve performance. But foreign strategic investors and the nature of the actual controller are accelerant of bank performance. In addition, the study also found that the board sizes have negative impact on performance. But the proportion of independent directors and bank elderships have certainly helpful for performance.The evidence suggests that the bank between CEO compensation and bank performance sensitivity is not strong. That is, bank CEO compensation is higher does not mean that the bank performance is more remarkable.In addition, the study also found that board of larger board, higher proportion of inside directors in board, long-tenure CEO and CEO who also chairs the board, its independence is worse. Board independence is worse and its surveillance efficiency is also low. In this case, the bank CEO compensation is easier to deviate the shareholder benefit, enlarges agency cost in these banks.