A Study On Price Competition And Coordination In Dual-channel Supply Chain In The E-commerce Age

With the gradual improvement of Internet infrastructure and Internet applications, more and more enterprises have set up their own online direct marketing platform. However, implementations of mixed-channel model are facing many challenges, the traditional retail channels, out of dissatisfaction with the manufacturer, choose to give up the product distribution agents, and also may result in lack of trust. And such a competitive situation will destroy the relationship, leading to channel conflict. Therefore, channel selection and the development of rational management strategies become necessary for enterprises to face and solve problems.In this paper, we firstly solve the optimal pricing of the supply chain channel members by building manufacturers and retailers Bertrand game model, the leading manufacturers Stackelberg game model, the leading retailers Stackelberg game model with this object of channel harmony and channel members in the channel to maximize their own interests. Through sensitivity analysis, we discuss the influence of different parameters to the prices of manufacturers and retail channels of the game.Then we specifically analyze the way to use the coordination contract to make the supply chain improve profits with two common coordination mechanism-quantity discounts and two part tariffs.Finally, we extend the hypothesis of this study from the symmetric information to asymmetric information, and study the pricing model of manufacturers and retailers under asymmetric information of the needs. By building an integrated supply chain, decentralizing control supply chain system without information sharing, decentralizing control supply chain system with information sharing, we solve the optimal pricing of both the manufacturers and retailers, and then with a numerical computation example we discuss effect of changes in the variance of demand forecast on both profits.