Regulation Of Coal Mine Safety Contrace Selation

Most countries has gone through the process of coal mine safety from low quality to high-quality level changes, it can say that mine disaster has been affecting the development of coal industry in most countries and regions.China also has serious problem of coal mine safety, mainly reflects inadequate input in the security and inefficient supervision. It has caused widespread concern in political and academic circles.In this paper, we use Contract Economics and Transaction Cost Economics to analyze the regulatory effects on different contracts. Firstly, we talk about the mine safety research literatures. Because research perspectives on this topic vary, we talk about from the different study methods. These methods can be classified into three types, such as economic analysis method, legal analysis and international comparison. Secondly, we introduce the problems and status of China's coal mine safety regulations. Different from other literatures, we think the main problem of China coal mine safety regulation is how to change the mode of security regulation. That's to say, how to change the model from government-drive model to market-drive model. Rely on the threat of punishment can not fundamentally solve the problem. However, if companies are willing to carry out safety, then it can achieve high level of security. Meanwhile, coal mine safety regulations must also resolve the crowding out effect between companies and miners'security input. Thirdly, we use models to analyze the results of different contracts regulation. It shows that under fixed contract safety regulations,1 security input can only be affected by the expected punishment. Supervision input and payment of a fixed subsidy does not affect the security input behavior of corporate. It can be seen, the regulation model of the fixed contract still depends on threat.Under the share contract safety regulations, supervision input and safety allowance can affect the security investment behavior of corporate and at this point there is effective supervision. The higher level of security the enterprises have achieve, the greater the subsidies they can get. Meanwhile, the Government can control the level of subsidy and oversight into the safety of investment in coal enterprises. If give the enterprises some subsidies according to the level of security they achieved, it may be useful to the change of the mode of safety regulation. In the end, with the results of the model, we use graphical tools to analyze the strengths and limitations Different from other studies on coal mine safety regulation, this adjustment is not limited to the analysis of the safety monitoring system. However, we see the coal mine safety as a product. In order to provide high quality products, we must provide some incentive to high-quality products. Although we discuss the coal mine safety regulation's contract choice from the theoretic angle, if it can help to provide a new thinking of changing on the mode of coal mine safety regulation, also indirectly prove the meaning of this paper.