Study On The Reforming And Developing Of Salary System Of Local State-owned Property Representative

Local state-funded enterprise is the leading force in local economy and managers play key roles in keeping enterprise steadily, rapidly and sustainably developing and growing. In these enterprises, state-owned property representatives are generally decision-makers and senior managers. To achieve the objective of state-owned capital value Maximization is largely dependant on motivating these representatives. In this case, theoretical study and practical approach to local state-funded property representatives & their salary system is always the focusing point of discussion among our theorists and socialist. However, up to date there's still argument on the definition of'local state-funded property representative'in the theoretic and practical field. Additionally, the specialty of their origin, identity background and functional role perplex the salary issue. Salary level and motivation system vary from one area to another resulting from the diversity in local economy development level, income distribution policy and state-owned property supervision and administration system. But in general, some common problems currently exist in salary system designed for local state-owned property representative, such as derivation from the objective to achieve the state-owned capital value maximization, limited scope, no standard to calculate, unreasonable salary system and performance appraisal, lack of control and monitoring, not fully in accordance with efficiency, fairness, legal and moral principle Under this circumstance, how to analyze and solve these problems is one of the main and desperate concerns. It's very important to establish a fair, reasonable, objective and transparent salary system for state-owned property representatives. This thesis intends to discuss the key issues of salary system for state-owned property representatives through its change and present situation, from individual case study to general cases. It will come to the conclusion of enhancing the effectiveness of salary and motivation system trough centralizing the supervision and administration system of state-owned assets based on the study of special functional role of state-owned property representative and entrusted relationship utilizing the methods of public management, economics. In the later part of this thesis, some case study of Zhuhai enterprises reflect the increasing gap between the salary of representatives and staffs, monetary salary comparably low to senior managers in other type of enterprises, other related compensation excluded in total salary. There's no equal standard to grade salary and salary system need to get improved . Due to shortage of proper motivation against external competition and surplus recessive motivation, it's difficult to meet the requirement of state-owned capital value maximization. Establishing the centralized state assets supervision and administration system, improving the monitoring system, disclosing the procedure of determining salary, defining the importance and priority of different position contributing to the business performance, effectively evaluating the ratio of related compensation in total salary amount, mandatory supervision and administration system will all enhance the motivation and increase the efficiency of operating state property and optimize the allocation of resources.