Influences On Information Opacity From Company Management Of Central Enterprises

In recent years, listed companies of central enterprises continue to appear problems of company management, which seriously affect long-term development of the company. In order to resolve these issues, this passage traced the source of information opacity of central enterprises from various points. Therefore, this article from the root of the problem of central enterprises-the transparency of information starting from the theoretical and empirical point of view, the central enterprises to explore the impact of information transparency of the factors the company, and proposed various ways to enhance information transparency. The article is organized as follows:In the first part, on the basis of reviewing and comment of related domestic and foreign references, this article looks back on research status about the influences on company information opacity caused by various management structure characteristics of domestic and foreign listed companies. This lays both theoretical and practical basis for follow-up studies in this article. In the second part, this article theoretically analyses the source of central enterprises information opacity from the following two points: information demand and suppliers encouragement. In terms of information demand, the passage explains the relations between central enterprises stakeholders and information suppliers and demand from the characteristic of state-owned banks——the features of central enterprises holdings and its major creditors. On the other hand, the passage analyses from the propitious point of suppliers. This paper also includes an analysis about relations between opacity and other two aspects called pay rewarding system and control rewarding mechanism. At the same time, it discovers the reason why representatives of central enterprises leadership have distorted behaviours. Then it proceeds to expose that managers haven't announced the information of rewarding, which is the main factor that leads to information opacity.In the third part, according to previous theories, the author makes an systemic and comprehensive analysis and empirical test on the basis of four features including equity structure, liability composition, rewarding mechanism and the influence on information transparency from the board of directors. Based on self-built transparency standards, the author sets up a gradual backward regression model and observes and studies influences on information transparency caused by management structure of central enterprises listed holdings companies. As is demonstrated in the empirical test, the more the interests held by the first shareholder, the higher the information transparency is; the more the control level is, the bigger the reaction of information transparency is. Meanwhile, payments of managers have positive effect on information transparency. In addition, if the company has bigger size, it will have more influences on company's information transparency. The size of a company has great impact on information transparency of the company, but influences from finance lever, earning capacity and asset turnover ratio are not so remarkable.In the final part, on the basis of researches about the root of problems and empirical analysis findings, this paper raises four new methods to increase information transparency, including optimizing equity structure, training more investors, designing top payments rewarding system with reasonable systems and strengthening external supervision as well as improving the information report mechanism.