On Disappearance Form Of The Identity Theory From Rorty

Since 17th century Descartes proposed mind-body dualism, many western philosophers participated in this issue around it’s rationality.Entering the second half of 20th century, the rapid development of science and technology roused the trend of physicalism. the exploration of brain science, like peeling Onions, uncovered the mystery of mental entity.At this very moment identity theory once again became the focus of attention.Compared with other philosophers Rorty saw the deep-seated problem behind identity theory, the gap between mind and body couldn’t be filled completely by technical categories analysis.In the face of such an awkward situation, eliminative materialism began to rise. Since strict identity can’t be operated practically, we just get rid of mental entity from the discussion of ontology. Although the radical method has great markets in scientific community, but once coming into ordinary people’s life, it becomes extremely unreasonable. About60’sin the last century what’s so-called disappearance form of the identity theory was put forward by Richard Rorty. Different from the aggressive attitude of eliminative materialism, he regarded this ontology shift as a product of the human community’s practical exploration.The replacement between two theories isn’t equivalent to Darwinian evolution which select the superior and eliminate the inferior, but is the result of natural language practice.He realized that with the deepening of the current scientific practice, the primary ontology form based on the Myth of given will be no longer applicable, instead of a purely physicalistic ontology pattern.However, he didn’t want to see a furious conflict between scientific discourse and daily discourse, therefore, he advocated that the course of ontology shift happened gradually, new consensus reached among human community over a period of adaptation process. Rorty attributed ontology shift to practical exploration, the traditional binary contradiction to the painfulness of shifting.But according to his attitude of pragmatism, it’s easy to guess that eventually he will deny the whole presupposition of ontology.